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SYSTEMATIC INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND
DISPOSSESSION: THE BEDOUIN IN ISRAEL
Morad Elsana *
0F

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2007, the Israeli government unilaterally
decided to settle the Bedouin land dispute and dispose of
their land claims. 1 The state ordered Bedouin land claims
to be promptly adjudicated in court. 2 The court,
however, followed a forty-year-old precedent and
rejected all Bedouin claims. 3

* Dr. Morad Elsana is a visiting professor at American University. Dr.
Elsana holds a Doctor of Juridical Science from the American University,
Washington College of Law; L.L.M., American University, Washington
College of Law, 2007; Master of Social Work in Social Advocacy and
Community Development, from McGill University; and Bachelor's in law,
Tel Aviv University. Dr. Elsana is the recipient of Fulbright Outreach
Fellowship (2009-2012; the New Israel Fund Civil Rights Leadership
fellowship (2006-2007; and the McGill University "Middle East Program
for Civil Society & Peace Building" fellowship (2000-2002). From 20012009, Dr. Elsana served as a Lawyer and director of Adalah-The Legal
Center of Arab Minority Rights – the Naqab (Negev) Office. Dr. Elsana has
also worked as a legal advisor for Genesis Community Advocacy
Organization in Beer Sheva and as pro bono legal advisor for the Regional
Council for Unrecognized Villages in the Naqab (Negev). Dr. Elsana’s
areas of research interest focus on human rights law; indigenous peoples’
rights; legal pluralism; comparative law; Colonialism, racial justice and
the Arab Minority in Israel; and the Arab-Israeli conflict.
1

See Israeli Government Res. 2491 (Oct. 28, 2007).
See id.
3 See CA (BS) 7161/06 Suleiman Aluqbi v. St. of Israel, (unpublished
manuscript) (2012) (Isr.).
2
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In reaction, as part of the Bedouin’s attempts to
defend their rights, they, with several scholars, 4 decided
to challenge the legal status of Bedouin land through
judicial intervention. 5 This could change the longtime
Alhawashelah precedent from 1984 and convince the
court to recognize Bedouin land rights. 6 Despite their
intensive research and intellectual efforts, however, the
test case they chose to take to court was also rejected. 7
While recent research focuses on the judicial
means that deprive the Bedouin of their lands 8, this
article presents the other part of the picture: a major part
of the Bedouin lands was not expropriated by recent
judicial means. Instead, they were legislated through
laws by the Israeli Knesset and enforced by the
administrative infrastructure overseen by the executive
branch of the government through political and
administrative means. 9

4

See Morad Elsana, The Role of the Judiciary in Dispossessing
Indigenous Peoples’ Land: The Bedouin Case in Israel, 33 J. JURIS. 333
(2017); Oren Yiftachel, Alexander (Sandy) Kedar & Ahmad Amara, ReExamining the ‘Dead Negev Doctrine’: Property Rights in the BedouinArab Space, 14 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL (2012).
5 See id.
6 See id.
7 See CA (BS) 7161/06 Suleiman Aluqbi et. al. v. State of Israel, supra
note 3; Suleiman Aluqbi v. St. of Israel, (2012).
8See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford U. Press ed., 1996); see also Elsana, supra
note 4; see also Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title,
Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2006).
9 See generally Singer, supra note 8.
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For many indigenous peoples throughout the
world, the judicial battles to preserve or regain land
rights generally started after violence from the initial
dispossession that occurred. 10 In the Bedouin’s case, the
timeline of this experience is somewhat more recent
when compared to the narratives of the indigenous
peoples of the Americas or Australia. 11 Therefore,
judicial actions overlap with ongoing administrative
executive and political legislative acts of land
dispossession. 12 Thus, untangling the specific sources
and methods of land dispossession becomes essential in
the ongoing effort to understand the Bedouin peoples’
encounter with a version of a settler colonial state. 13
This article argues the indigenous land issue is
not a classical legal case. Rather, it is an issue with a
sharp political, ideological and cultural character.
Therefore, the handling of the issue in court is “unusual”
in many ways. It poses many non-conventional issues
and clearly contradicts basic principles of justice. The
article starts by showing that most Bedouin land rights
were dispossessed through a colonial methodology that
combines settlement, occupation, and acquisition of
indigenous land on multiple levels rather than typical

10

See BILL YENNE, INDIAN WARS: THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE AMERICAN
WEST (2006).
11See generally LOUIS A. KNAFLA, ABORIGINAL TITLE AND
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND (W.
Wesley Pue, et al. eds., 2010).
12
See Singer, supra note 8.
13 See generally Elsana, supra note 4.
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judicial decisions. 14 The first part of land dispossession
occurred through settlement and international decisions
that supported the dispossession. 15 The second part
occurred after the establishment of the “settler state”
through colonial oriented, administrative and legislative
actions that ignore indigenous Bedouin land rights. 16
Many of these acts are for the sole benefit and interest of
the settler population. 17 Moreover, these acts laid the
groundwork for later colonial legal rulings that only
confirmed previous administrative and legislative
actions, and continued to ignore indigenous Bedouin
land rights. 18
Section two of this article introduces the
indigenous land dispossession, generally exploring how
indigenous land was dispossessed in several phases by
different methods that include administrative, executive,
and judicial ones. 19 Section three introduces essential
background about the Bedouin, including their
demographics and land dispute. Then, section four
describes the process of Bedouin land dispossession on
the general level as part of the Palestinian land

14See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford U. Press ed., 1996).
15See id.
16 See Elsana, supra note 4, at 6.
17 See id.
18See generally First Nations Summit, Implementation of
Jurisprudence Concerning Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: Experiences from
the Americas - A Canadian Perspective 19-20 (2005),
http://www.fns.bc.ca/pdf/Implementationof Jurisprudence_IP1005.pdf.
19 See Singer, supra note 8.
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dispossession. 20 Section five focuses on the specific
level of land dispossession, describing the explicit
methods designated solely and especially for Bedouin in
the Negev. 21 This section details the administrative and
legislative methods for land dispossession, mainly the
concentration plan and the Goldberg plan. 22 On the
legislative level, this section looks at three acts and
focuses on the Land Settlement Ordinance of 1969 as a
major instrument for Bedouin land dispossession.23
Finally, section six concludes with a discussion that aims
to shed light on elements and tactics the state has been
using to bend the rules (on the judiciary level) in order to
make sure courts follow the state’s plan. 24
II. THE DISPOSSESSION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES LAND
RIGHTS

The dispossession of indigenous peoples’ land
rights remains one of the most common human rights
violations around the world. 25 After the discovery of the
New World, the Europeans started a long process of

20

See Elsana, supra note 4, at 9.
See generally Israeli Government Res. 2491 (Oct. 28, 2007).
22 See generally Ministry Of Construction & Housing, GOLDBERG
REPORT
31–2
(2009),
http://www.moch.gov.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/odot/doch_goldberg/Do
ch_Vaada_Shofet_Goldberg.pdf.
23 See Elsana, supra note 4, at 19.
24 See generally Elsana, supra note 4.
25 See Erica-Irene A., Economic and Social Council Final Working
Paper
No.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21,
38
(June
11,
2001),
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/demo/RelationshiptoLand_Daes.pdf.
21
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conquest, occupation, and colonization of indigenous
peoples’ lands. 26 The newcomers took over the territory
of indigenous peoples while denying their sovereignty,
their land rights, their cultural expression, and, on
several occasions, their very existence. 27
While specifics vary, indigenous peoples around
the globe fiercely opposed the European invasions and
resisted the occupation of their lands. 28 In many
instances, they even engaged in wars or armed conflicts
with the invaders to resist the acquisition and occupation
of their lands. 29 However, the Europeans ultimately took
over indigenous peoples’ lands and territories through
military dominance. 30 After conquering and occupying
the lands, colonial powers and the new settlers
established their new sovereign state’s power over the

26

See ANAYA, supra note 14, at 3.
See First Nations Summit, Implementation of Jurisprudence
Concerning Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: Experiences from the Americas A
Canadian
Perspective
19-20
(2005),
http://www.fns.bc.ca/pdf/Implementationof Jurisprudence_IP1005.pdf; see
also PETER H. RUSSELL, RECOGNIZING ABORIGINAL TITLE: THE MABO CASE
AND INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE TO ENGLISH-SETTLER COLONIALISM (2006 U.
of Toronto Press ed., 2005) (discussing how Aboriginal peoples’ leaders
and state representatives, such as Edward Woodward, head of the
Woodward Commission, traveled from Australia to the United States and
Canada to learn about the recognition of indigenous peoples land rights);
EPHRAIM YUCHTMAN-YAAR & ZE’EV SHABAT, MAGAMUT BAHEVRAH
HAYESRAILIT [TRENDS IN ISRAELI SOCIETY] 1218 (2003) (discussing former
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's denial of the existence of a Palestinian
nation).
28 See KNAFLA, supra note 11, at 173.
29
See YENNE, supra note 10, at 7.
30 See ELSANA, supra note 4, at 7.
27
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indigenous territories. 31 With their new governmental
systems—administrative, political, and, eventually,
judicial—they continued dispossessing the remaining of
indigenous peoples’ lands. 32 Hence, while conquest and
occupation enabled taking physical possession, the new
state’s administrative, political, and judicial methods
were utilized to legitimize their acts of dispossession.33
At the same time, this ensured that no political or legal
options were available for indigenous people to defend
or regain their land rights. 34
The process of dispossession rarely, if ever,
proceeded in a clear, simple sequence, and depending on
the size of the territory, the physical conquest often
overlapped with the establishment of the governmental
systems that established the Western legal apparatus for
nullifying the rights of indigenous peoples to their own
lands in perpetuity. 35 While the judicial method of
dispossession was often the last method utilized by a
government, it often overlapped in its establishment and
actions with ongoing administrative policies and
political or legislative actions that expropriated land
from indigenous peoples. 36 One need to think only of

31

See generally, JÉRÉMIE GILBERT, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND
RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM VICTIMS TO ACTORS (2006)
(discussing methods of land dispossession).
32 See Singer, supra note 8.
33 See id.
34 See id.
35
See generally ANAYA, supra note 14, at 3.
36 See id.
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the history of the United States and the infamous Trail of
Tears to recognize the pattern of executive and
legislative actions, overlapping with, in that case,
somewhat more sympathetic judicial action that
nevertheless ultimately dispossessed tens of thousands
of indigenous peoples from their lands. 37
The international community supported the
invasion and occupation of indigenous peoples of the
New World. 38 Unlike modern international law that
protects the rights of indigenous peoples, during that
time, international law supported colonial acts of
invasion and land dispossession even when they violated
indigenous peoples’ rights. 39 “Europeans” at that time
denied indigenous peoples in the New World the right of
sovereignty and facilitated the dispossession of their
land. 40 Old principles of international law and legal
doctrines, such as the Doctrine of Discovery and terra
nullius, justified the occupation and the dispossession of
indigenous peoples’ land. 41 Relying on such
international law principles, colonial powers made
fictional assumptions regarding indigenous peoples' land
that severely affected their land rights. 42 They did this

37

See id.
See id. at 9, 26.
39 See id. at 6, 15-26.
40 See id. at 22.
41See Blake Watson, The Impact of the American Doctrine of
Discovery on Native Land Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand,
34 SEATTLE UNIV. LAW REV. 507, 512 (2011).
42 See id.
38
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first, by claiming that indigenous peoples did not legally
exist (thus their land could be acquired); then, by arguing
that they were inferior to the colonial powers (thus their
right to lands could be extinguished). 43 In the United
States, for example, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
John Marshall similarly justified the way in which
colonial powers laid claim to indigenous peoples’ lands
during the Age of Discovery. 44 Australia considered
Aboriginal land as a vacant land and denied their land
ownership claims. 45 Similarly, Israel considers all
Bedouin's land as mawat land, which literally means
“dead land.” 46
Despite this, during the last few decades
indigenous people have succeeded in bringing their
issues to the attention of the international community. 47
Moreover, several international organizations, such as
the International Labor Organization (ILO), have raised
the issue and called for recognition of indigenous

43

See GILBERT, supra note 31; Gilda C. Rodriguez, Wik Peoples v.
State of Queensland: A Restrained Expansion of Aboriginal Land Rights,
23 N. C. J. INT. LAW COMMER. REGUL. 711, 722 (1997).
44 See Watson, supra note 41 at 511.
45 See Rodriguez, supra note 43 at 722.
46
See Chanina Porat, Israel’s Policy on the Bedouin Issue and LeftWing Alternatives, 1953-1960, 10 Iyyunim BiTekumat Israel 420–476, 457
(2000) (explaining Bedouin submitted land claims as early as the 1950s.
They based their land claims on documents proving that they had paid taxes.
However, the State claimed that no land titles settlement occurred in the
Negev; therefore, Bedouin did not possess any proof of land ownership. In
addition, the State claimed that tax documents were lost from the State
archives).
47 See generally ANAYA, supra note 14.
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peoples’ land rights. 48 Others have articulated several
instruments that recognize and protect indigenous
peoples’ rights. For example, in 2007, international
recognition of indigenous peoples’ land rights through
the United Nations Universal Declaration for the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples. 49 Unfortunately, despite these
substantial developments, international law continues to
offer very limited protection for their land rights. 50
On the national level, after the establishment of
the settlers-state, indigenous peoples began to struggle
for their land rights through the settler-state system, but
mainly through local courts. 51 But as this article shows,
their legal struggle was also cut off and doomed to
failure. The legislations the settler-state enacted and the
administrative processes it carried out not only led to the
dispossession of indigenous lands, but also created the
platform for legal supremacy and even eliminated any
chance of indigenous claims in court. 52 Furthermore,
changes settler-states made on the ground, and many
other factors—not directly related to land conflict—such
as language competence (difficulties) and a difficult

48

See generally GILBERT, supra note 31.
See generally Universal Declaration for the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples,
G.A.
Res.
61/295
(Oct.
2,
2007),
https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wpcontent/uploads/sites/19/2018/11/UNDRIP_E_web.pdf.
50 See GILBERT, supra note 31 at 114.
51 See Elsana, supra note 4 at 336 (explaining although other struggle
and advocacy options were available more attention was given to the legal
advocacy).
52 See id. at 367.
49
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economic situation have made their struggle impotent;
without a real chance of success. 53
However, in the recent decades, many
indigenous groups around the globe, with no other
choice, focus on judicial advocacy; sometimes they
overestimate the power of judges and courts to recognize
their rights. 54 They tend to forget the inherent conflict
between colonialism and injustice, especially in land
conflicts. 55 They also ignore the historical fact that the
majority of indigenous peoples’ land was mainly
dispossessed by non-judicial methods. 56 But, most
importantly, they forget that when they approached
national courts to protect their rights, and recognize their
right, national courts—with some exceptions—could not
provide any protection, in the contrary many times courts
supported the colonial action and even legitimized
them. 57
The Bedouin case shows how their land was
dispossessed and how the Bedouin’s have been trying,
with no avail, to get their land rights recognized in the
courts that have been denying their cases time after time.
This article goes further to show how the state, using
legislation, and administrative orders was able to

53

See id. at 357.
See generally Gilbert, supra note 31.
55 See id. at 157.
56 See id.
57 See generally Elsana, supra note 4 (according to the decisions of J.
Marshall in the US context and the decision of the Israeli Supreme court in
Alhawashela case).
54
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dispossess about 90% of Bedouin land. 58 Moreover,
these legislative and administrative orders insured the
Bedouin’s land rights were denied in court.
III. THE BEDOUIN AND THEIR LAND ISSUE
A. THE BEDOUIN

The Bedouin in Israel live in the Negev, the
southern part of Israel. 59 They are part of the ArabPalestinian minority in Israel 60 that consists of between
200,000 and 230,000 people. They constitute about
3.5% of Israel’s population. 61 The Bedouin live in two
types of settlements: (1) village the state has recognized
(“townships”) and (2) villages that the state considers
illegal settlements (“villages” or “unrecognized
villages”). 62 Approximately two-thirds of the Bedouin
population in the Negev live in seventeen townships and
nearly one-third live in thirty-five unrecognized

58

See generally Elsana, supra note 4.
See Salman Elbedour et al., Bedouins of the Negev: Ethnicity and
Ethnic Identity among Bedouin Adolescents in Israel, 2 INT. J. CHILD
HEALTH HUM. DEV. 177 (2009) (exploring Bedouin identity).
60 See id.
61 See Lexicon of Terms: Minorities in Israel, Bedouin, THE KNESSET
(July 2007), http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/heb/bedouim.htm; Ghazi
Falah, Israeli State Policy toward Bedouin Sedentarization in the Negev, 18
J. OF PALESTINE STUDIES 71, 78 (1989).
62 See Shiri Bass Spector, Environmental and Health Issues Among
Bedouin in the Negev Unrecognized Villages, KNESSET RESEARCH AND
INFORMATION
CENTER
(2011),
http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m02809.pdf.
59
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villages. 63 Bedouins who live in unrecognized villages
are deprived of very basic rights and services, including
running water, electricity, secure infrastructure,
education, health services, and social services. 64 But
most importantly, they are not allowed to build any
houses in these villages. 65 Thus, they are subject to harsh
state acts such as, house demolitions, crop destruction,
livestock confiscation, and land expropriation, 66 all due
to a longtime dispute over the land.
Historically, the Bedouin have lived as a seminomadic people in the Negev for centuries, well before
the establishment of the State of Israel and some would
say since the fifth century C.E. 67 The Bedouin have
lived in the Negev from the time immemorial and
consider themselves natives. 68
Mischaracterizations of their nomadic and seminomadic lifestyle have been used as part of the narrative
to undermine claims to their historic presence in the
Negev and to assert a lack of ties to these specific
lands. 69 However, the Bedouin have long-held tribal

63

See id.

64See

HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH,
OFF
THE
MAP,
http://hrw.org/reports/2008/03/30/map (last visited Mar. 5, 2019).
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See PENNY MADDRELL & YUNIS GRINAWI, THE BEDOUIN OF THE
NEGEV 4, LONDON MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP (1990).
68 See Yiftachel, supra note 4 at 134-36.
69 See Havatzelet Yahel, Ruth Kark & Seth J. Frantzman, Are the
Negev Bedouin an Indigenous People?, MIDDLE EAST Q. (2012),
http://www.meforum.org/3254/negev-bedouin-indigenous (last visited Jan
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territorial boundaries, defined by intra- and inter-tribal
agreements of customary tribal law, forged over
generations and preserved in indigenous documents
called Sanadat. 70 Sanadat describe the Bedouin land,
rights, boundaries of different tribes’ lands, size, and the
owners and many other details related to their land, just
like any modern title deed.
B. THE BEDOUIN’S LAND ISSUE

Since its establishment, the State of Israel has
been denying Bedouin land rights and continues to
dispossess their lands in order to drive them out. 71 The
dispossession of Bedouin land 72 can be divided into two
general phases: (1) the occupation of the land, and (2) the
legalization of the occupation of the land. 73 The State
first occupied the Bedouin’s land, evicted many of them
and concentrated the remaining groups into a small area
in the northern Negev called Siyag. 74 Then, in the second
phase, it enacted several laws that further enabled the
dispossession of Bedouin land through legislative and
judicial means. 75 Courts have supported the

9, 2017) (This article shows how some Israeli scholars, who are affiliated
with the government, present the Bedouins in Israel).
70 See Elsana supra note 4.
71 See Havatzelet, supra 69 at 8-9.
72 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF THE MAP, supra note 64.
73 See id.
74
See id.
75 See id.
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dispossession and made sure the interpretation of the law
maintained the same principles. 76
Like Palestinian lands, Bedouin lands were
occupied as part of the colonial activity of the Zionist
settlement movement in Palestine during the British
Mandate. These lands were then occupied during the
war fought in 1947 to 1948, immediately after the U.N.
vote to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. 77 The early
colonial history of the Bedouin barely even scratches the
surface of the broader history of European colonialism
that reshaped the map of the Middle East in the wake of
World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman
Empire. 78
The Negev had been part of the Ottoman Empire
for centuries, and it fell under British rule (later British
Mandate) in Palestine from 1917 to 1948. 79 The land
reforms to settle and register land rights (title deeds),
instituted by the Ottomans and continued by the British
in Palestine, were not applied to the Bedouin lands in the
Negev. 80 However, in practice, both the Ottomans and
the British largely accepted the Negev Bedouins’ tribal
system for establishing land claims, handling land
disputes between tribes, paying taxes on lands, and

76

See id.
See YEHUSHOA PORAT & YAKOVSHAVIT, THE HISTORY OF ERETZ
YESRAEL: THE BRITISH MANDATE AND THE JEWISH NATIONAL HOME (1998).
78 See Ahmad Amara, The Negev Land Question Between Denial and
Recognition, 42 THE J. OF PALESTINE STUDIES 4, 27, 30-34 (2013).
79
See id. at 29.
80 See id. at 30.
77
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managing land-related issues. 81 Hence, neither the
Ottoman nor British land registry laws were applied to
the Negev Bedouin. 82 Thus, when the British Mandate
ended and the State of Israel was established, the
Bedouin found themselves facing a different settlercolonial ruler who applied the old rules in new ways that
did not recognize their indigenous land rights. 83
IV. BEDOUIN LAND DISPOSSESSION ON THE GENERAL
LEVEL

The roots of the Bedouin land issue can be traced
to the history and developments in Palestine and the
Middle East since the late 18th century. 84 Like many
Palestinian lands, Bedouin lands were occupied as part
of the Zionist movement in Palestine. 85 The first phase
of their dispossession was done as a part of the entire
Palestinian land dispossession without specific attention
to Bedouin land in the Negev. 86 While the second phase
was completed later as part of an explicit project
designated to specifically dispossess the indigenous
Bedouins of the Negev. 87

81

See id. at 31-34.
See id.
83 See id.
84 See Elsana supra note 4.
85 See Falah, supra note 61, at 73.
86
See Elsana, supra note 4, at 339.
87 See id.
82
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Settlement in Palestine started to be the primary
goal for the Zionist movement after the decision to
establish a State for the Jewish people. 88 During the late
19th century, the Zionist movement held its first
conference where it decided to establish a Jewish state in
Palestine. As part of its plan, the Zionist movement
started a process of settlements in different places in
Palestine. To facilitate Jewish settlement, the Zionist
movement focused on land purchase in Palestine. 89
In addition to the above-mentioned reasons, the
Zionist movement of settlement in Palestine was also
supported by both practical (the need for land) and
ideological levels. 90 On a practical level, Zionist leaders
believed that possession of land in Palestine was an
essential element for the Zionist project’s success, vital
for the future Jewish state, and important to
accommodate incoming Jewish immigrants. 91 On the
ideological level, the movement embraced a biblically
based ideology that claimed that the land in Palestine
(i.e. the land of Israel) was divinely given to the Jewish

88

Practical Zionism - under the leadership of Moshe Lilienblum and
Yehuda Leib Pinsker - argued that immigration to Israel and settlement
should begin soon, even before the attainment of a charter for the Land of
Israel. The proponents of this approach emphasized the need for large-scale
settlement in Paestine/Eretz Israel that would help establish a national
home. See WALTER LAQUEUR, A HISTORY OF ZIONISM 103-07 (2003); Oren
Yiftachel, Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine,
(2006).
89 See id.
90
See Elsana, supra note 4 at 340.
91 See id.
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people, and thus, Jews must “redeem the land” from nonJewish inhabitants. 92 Many of the movement’s leaders
also brought with them a European culture of bias that
viewed the Arabs, particularly the Bedouin, as
uncivilized people, and viewed their land as empty land,
terra nullius in the classical sense. 93
A. INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

As a result of the influx of Jewish migrants from
Europe to Palestine and the spread of the news about the
Zionist plan to establish a Jewish state, Palestinians
demonstrated against the British mandate and
demanded the restriction of Jewish migration.
demanding to restrict the Jewish migration. 94 These
“demonstrations” reached their peak in the 1936 Arab
Revolt. 95 The British, who ruled during that time, asked
for the intervention of the international community and
forwarded the issue to the League of Nations, who in
turn, decided to establish a committee, the Peel
Commission, to search for and suggest a solution for the
issue. 96 After deliberations, the committee came up

92

See id. at 341-2.
See GERSHON SHAFIR, LAND, LABOR, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT, 1882-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge
(University Press, 1989); Yiftachel, supra note 88 at 54.
94 See Elsana, supra note 4 at 350-54 (discusses British mandate’s
refusal to recognize Bedouin customary law).
95 See MATTHEW KELLY, THE CRIME OF NATIONALISM: BRITAIN,
PALESTINE, AND NATION-BUILDING ON THE FRINGE OF EMPIRE 11, 58 (2017).
96 See Elsana, supra note 4 at 348-49; MARTIN GILBERT, THE
ROUTLEDGE ATLAS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 12-3 (2012).
93
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with the partition plan to divide Palestine into two
states: an Arab state and a Jewish state. 97 During that
time (1937), Zionist leaders discovered that the
proposed Jewish state borders excluded the Negev
region. 98 Zionist leaders acknowledged the need to
expand Jewish settlements into the Negev in order to
convince the international community to include the
Bedouin territory in the Negev to the future Jewish
state. 99
They also came to understand that the rules of
partition of the land were based mainly on the
“existence of majority.” 100 In places where the majority
of people were Jews, the committee offered the area to
the Jewish state, and in areas of Arab majority, the area
was offered to the Arab state. 101 Jewish leaders realized
that to get the Negev included into the future Jewish
state, they had to settle it with Jewish settlers.102
Therefore, over the next two years, 103 the Zionist
movement established eleven small colonies in the
Negev, each with only a little more than a wall and a
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See Elsana, supra note 4 at 348-49.
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Negev before the War of Independence, 62 CATHEDRA 123–54, 393 (1991).
99 See id.
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101 See id.
102 See id.
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watchtower. 104 The Zionist movement’s plan worked
and the 1947 League of Nations Partition Plan for
Palestine designated the Negev as part of the Jewish
state. 105
B. THE 1948 WAR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW
STATE

The Partition Plan, however, was just the
beginning of the conquest phase of the land
dispossession for the Palestinian land, including the
Bedouin. The 1948 war that broke out when the British
ended the mandate on Palestine and decamped, resulted
in the conquest of the rest of Negev. The brutality of the
Jewish paramilitary organizations during the 1948 war,
and later by the Israeli Army, with their determination to
expel as many Palestinian Arabs from their homes as
possible, 106 resulted in the eviction of an estimated
700,000 Palestinians, only an estimated 160,000
remained. 107 When the border of the State of Israel was
finally established in 1949, the Palestinians who

104 See Porat, supra 98 at 123 (describing the Zionist movement and
establishment of 11 Jewish settlements in the Negev, illustrating the Jewish
existence in the Negev).
105 See GILBERT, supra 96.
106 See BENNY MORRIS, RIGHTEOUS VICTIMS: A HISTORY OF THE
ZIONIST-ARAB CONFLICT, 1881-1998 (2011).
107 See ILAN PAPPE, A HISTORY OF MODERN PALESTINE: ONE LAND,
TWO PEOPLES 127 (2006).
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survived the war became citizens of the new Jewish
State. 108
After the establishment of Israel, despite their
Israeli citizenship, tens of thousands of PalestinianIsraelis were forcibly relocated from their original
villages to other villages; a practice that affected all
Arabs, but mainly the Bedouins of the Negev. 109 Indeed,
the majority of the remaining 11,000 Bedouins were
evicted from their land and relocated to a small area in
the northern Negev called the siyag, “fence” in
Hebrew. 110
After Israel’s independence, the State placed all
Palestinians under a military rule from 1949 until 1966
and forced many Palestinians to live in designated
areas. 111 During this eighteen year period, the State
worked on several levels to change the historical reality
and geography of the region. The State destroyed many
villages that were abandoned by the Palestinians and

108 See Nihad Bokae’e, Palestinian Internally Displaced Persons
Inside Israel: Challenging the Solid Structures, PALESTINE-ISRAEL J.
POLITICS, ECON. & CULTURE 2, 3-4 (2003).
109 See id.; WALID KHALIDI, ALL THAT REMAINS: THE PALESTINIAN
VILLAGES OCCUPIED AND DEPOPULATED BY ISRAEL IN 1948 (1992).
110 See Elsana, supra note 4 at 349; PENNY MADDRELL, BEDOUIN OF
THE NEGEV 6 (1989) (The Negev Bedouin population before 1948 had been
an estimated 65-95,000, and their historic lands covered all of the Negev.
Israel concentrated their remnant on 10% of their historic lands, in a
triangular area between Be’er Sheva, Arad, and Dimona.)
111 See generally The Arab-Israeli War of 1948, OFFICE OF THE
HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/arab-israeli-war
(last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
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prevented inhabitants from returning to their homes.112
The State built Jewish settlements in place of the
destroyed Palestinian villages, and changed the
geographical zoning of the land by planting forests or
building roads to make reestablishment of the Palestinian
villages impossible. 113 Israel took these actions despite
obligations under international law 114 and demands from
the international community that Israel allow refugees to
return to their homes. 115
C. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE

On the political level, land control became an
important component of the State’s settlement,
development, and defense policies. 116 The first leaders of
the State, such as David Ben-Gurion, Avraham Granott,
and Moshe Dayan, believed that State control of land

112

See Jonathan Cook, Palestinian Villages Hidden Under Israeli
Forests, VIMEO (Sept. 27, 2016) https://vimeo.com/184497845.
113 See id.
114 See Palestine - Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator,
G.A. Res. 194 (III), (Dec. 11, 1948) (recognizing the right of Palestinian
return for the first time. However, since it is only a General Assembly
resolution it is not binding under international law, as opposed to Security
Council resolutions).
115 See A Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)
(Dec. 10, 1948) (stating generally in Article 13 that: “[e]veryone has the
right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
State. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country”); see also An International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).
116 See Elsana, supra note 4.
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was an essential for the existence of Israel. 117 Acting on
this belief, that a Jewish presence on as much land as
possible within the State was essential for Israel’s future
security, Israel drafted plans for land control, which
focused on demographic engineering and population
distribution in the State. The overall goal of these plans
was to establish a Jewish presence in most areas of the
country, a goal that relied heavily on the State’s control
of land. 118 As a result, these policies were implemented,
without exception, from the northern border of Israel all
the way to the southern tip of the Negev. 119
On the legislative level, Israeli leaders strove to
ensure the laws of the State were in line with the goals of
the land control policies. 120 When the State adopted parts
of Ottoman law and terms from the British Mandate for
Palestine, 121 it applied a legal policy that deprived
Palestinian-Arabs, including the Bedouin, of their
land. 122 Over time, Israel amended or terminated many
Ottoman and British laws and have enacted new property
laws that deny Palestinian Arab’s land rights. 123 By
adopting British Article 46 of the Palestine Order in
Council-1922, which preserved part of Ottoman land

117

See id. at 340.
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See id. at 341.
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law, the State adopted the Ottoman law of the Majallah
that included the Ottoman land code. 124
On the administrative level, tools, such as
eviction orders, administrative relocations, service
deprivation, recognition and urban planning, and zoning,
provided additional methods for transferring PalestinianArab lands to the State. 125 Through planning laws and
zoning regulations, the State allocated the majority of
Arab land for Jewish settlement and development needs,
while preventing or reducing land available for ArabIsraeli citizens. 126 This planning policy affected all Arab
land dispossessions, but the Bedouin land in the Negev
was disproportionately affected. 127
In conclusion, the Zionist-Israeli colonial project
in Palestine was accomplished through a Jewish
settlement project initiated during Ottoman and then
continued during British rule; then exacerbated by the
international community’s partition of Palestine into a
Jewish State and an Arab State in 1947; and later
solidified through an Israeli military conquest of much
of the land designated as an Arab State in 1948. After the
establishment of the State, like many colonial powers,
Israel came to rely on its legislative and administrative
methods of land dispossession.
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V. THE DISPOSSESSION OF BEDOUIN LAND ON THE
SPECIFIC LEVEL

On the local level, Bedouin land in the Negev
was subject to additional policies of land
dispossession. 128 As mentioned above, the first phase of
the Bedouin land dispossession began in the 1930s after
the Peel Commission proposed a partition plan for
Palestine that excluded the Negev from the Jewish
State. 129 As a result, Zionist leaders established eleven
small colonies in the Negev in order to show the land was
settled by Jews. 130 Then in 1946, the Morrison-Grady
international committee, appointed by the League of
Nations, recommended a final partition plan that
partitioned most of the Negev land to the Jewish state. 131
The above-mentioned policies and acts of
Palestinian land dispossession directly affected the
Bedouin. 132 Mainly, these policies were able to transfer
most of the Bedouin’s land to the State. 133 However, the
Bedouin continue to possess and own about one and half
million dunams, about 370,000 acres, in the Negev, an
area the State considers essential for future settlement
and development. 134 Thus, Israel has been subjecting the

128

See id. at 348-349.
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130 See Elsana, supra note 4 at 349.
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132 See Elsana, supra note 4 at 349.
133
See id.
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Bedouin to additional policies and acts of land
dispossession that have been specifically designed for
the Bedouin in the Negev. These policies were executed
through various methods with the primary methods
being administrative and legislative policies. 135
A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAND DISPOSSESSION

On the administrative level, the state first
concentrated the Bedouin in a small area; second, it
forced them to live in small number of towns within a
designated area; and third, it declared all other Bedouin
villages as illegal settlements. 136
1. Concentrating the Bedouin in One Place

After the establishment of Israel, in order to
secure more land for Jewish settlement, the state
gathered the remaining Bedouins into a small area called
the Siyag. 137 Later, in 1956, the state and the military
institute started discussing the “Bedouin Problem,”
proposing a variety of possible ways to handle the
Bedouin in the Negev. 138 Interestingly, as Swirski and
Hasson mention “all of the proposals [the government]

135

See id.

136 See SHLOMO SWIRSKI & YAEL HASSON, INVISIBLE CITIZENS: ISRAEL

GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD THE NEGEV BEDOUIN (2006).
137 See Chanina Porat, Israel’s Policy on the Bedouin Issue and LeftWing Alternatives, 1953-1960, 10 IYYUNIM BITEKUMAT ISR. 420-76, 454.
138 See SWIRSKI & HASSON, supra note 136, at 15.
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considered shared a common denominator – reducing to
a minimum the area on which the Bedouin would be
settled in the Siyag region.” 139 Minister of Agriculture,
Moshe Dayan, who aimed to transform the Bedouin into
an urban proletaria, suggested settling Bedouin in mixed
Jewish-Arab localities at the center of Israel, along the
lines of the cities of Jaffa and Ramleh, where they would
become urban laborers. 140 The second proposal, which
eventually the state adopted, 141 suggested concentrating
the Bedouin in two or three townships within the Siyag
area in the Negev. 142
The plan to concentrate the Bedouin in smaller
areas, all within the already contained area of the Siyag,
was implemented gradually in several stages. In the first
stage, the state recognized two Bedouin townships and
required all Bedouin in the surrounding villages to
relocate to the new townships. 143 During that time, Israel
claimed that the purpose of the act was to modernize
Bedouin society by putting an end to the Bedouin’s
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Id. at 16.
141 Oren Yiftachel & H. Yacobi, Control, Resistance and Informality:
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(Ananya Roy & Nezar AlSayyad eds., 2003).
142
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nomadic way of life and provide them with modern
services. 144
The majority of Bedouins, however, opposed
leaving their villages, and the state’s efforts to relocate
the Bedouin failed. 145 The Bedouin who refused to leave
their villages also refused to abandon their way of life
and disrupt their traditional livelihoods. 146 Although
some state officials claimed that the Bedouin were
opposed to modernizing their society, in reality,
according to many commentators, the Bedouin were
mainly concerned that concentrating themselves in to
small towns would destroy their culture and their
traditional economy. 147 Since Bedouin economy relies
heavily on a combination of cultivating land and raising
livestock, land is essential to maintain their financial
independence. 148 In addition, the Bedouin were also
concerned that the policy would not only continue to
discriminate against them in planning and land
allocation, but also deprive them of their ability to live
traditionally with their extended families and tribes. 149
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Ismael Abu Saad & Cosette Creamer, Socio-Political Upheaval
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145 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF THE MAP, supra note 64.
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With limited success of the first stage of forced
sedentarization, the state continued to use every possible
opportunity to evict Bedouins from their traditional lands
and settle them into new townships. 150 One such
opportunity appeared with the application of the IsraelEgypt Peace Treaty. 151 In 1979, as part of the IsraelEgypt Peace Treaty, the state decided to relocate military
facilities from the Sinai Peninsula (which Israel returned
to Egypt as part of the treaty) onto the site of a large
Bedouin community in the Tal-Almalah area. 152 As part
of this move, the state not only confiscated large
segments of Bedouin land, but it also evicted every
Bedouin living in the Tal-Almalah area. 153 The Bedouin
were then relocated to two new towns, 154 created
especially for the purpose of resettling the Tal-Almalah
evacuees. 155 This relocation was legalized within Israeli
law by the Negev Land Acquisition Act (peace treaty
with Egypt) of 1980. 156
The four existing towns were insufficient
incentive to drive out the Bedouin from their villages.157
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Thus, in the third stage, Israel recognized additional
three Bedouin villages. 158 These villages were
established on Bedouin lands, and although some
Bedouins were living there already, the state expanded
the villages into towns and planned for increased
settlement of Bedouins from surrounding villages and
rural areas. 159 Another time, Israel attempted to
concentrate the Bedouins in now seven planned towns,
which was met with very limited success. 160
Over the next decade, Israel refused to recognize
or establish additional villages and continued its attempts
to settle Bedouin from unrecognized villages in the seven
existing, recognized towns. 161 This fourth stage
consisted of a two-part plan. The first part aimed to evict
the remaining Bedouin population living in forty-five
unrecognized villages (about 50% of the whole Bedouin
population in the Negev) and relocate them to the seven
recognized townships. 162 As part of the state plan to
force the Bedouin to relocate to the recognized towns, it
deprived the Bedouin in these villages of basic services,
such as housing, running water, electricity, education,
and health services. 163 It also applied a tough housing
demolition policy in order to force the Bedouin to leave
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their lands and relocate into the designated townships. 164
The second part of the plan was to re-engage with greater
intensity with the judicial process of settling Bedouin
land title claims, which meant creating a legal fiction that
officially dispossessed most Bedouin of their traditional
land. 165
In 1996, the Bedouin established the Regional
Council for the Unrecognized Villages (RCUV), the first
organization devoted to the rights of those who live in
the unrecognized villages. 166 The RCUV worked with
human
rights
non-governmental
organizations
(“NGOs”) to advocate for Bedouin rights, opposing the
State’s discrimination, oppression, and deprivation
policies. 167 In addition, during the 1990s and early 2000s
several human rights organizations started raising
international awareness about the plight of the Bedouin
of the Negev. 168 Eventually, the State realized that it was
impossible to settle the remaining Bedouin population
from forty-five villages into the existing seven
townships. 169 As a result, Israel recognized an additional
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ten villages between 2000 and 2012, creating a total of
seventeen Bedouin townships. 170
The State also made many changes to disconnect
the Bedouin physically, economically, and emotionally
from their land, like evicting Bedouins from their land,
and preventing agriculture use. 171 Such changes
destroyed the Bedouins’ traditional economy,
undermined their traditional leadership, and literally
changed the Bedouins’ landscape by building many
Jewish towns and other projects on their land. 172 The
State designed these changes to convey to the Bedouin a
clear message: that restoring the land to the Bedouin is
not an option. Instead, the only available solution is
compensation.
2. Planning and Zoning Policy

As a part of the concentration plan, the State
applied a planning and urbanization policy in order to
prevent Bedouin re-settlement outside the designated

several decisions ordering the State to build schools, clinics, and streets for
Bedouin in unrecognized villages. On the other hand, the seven recognized
villages remained poor and many people could not secure building lots to
live in the recognized parts of the villages.
170 This number is not fixed. It is expected to increase each time the
State recognizes additional Bedouin villages.
171 See generally, Ghazi Falah, Israeli State Policy Toward Bedouin
Sedentarization in the Negev, 18 J. PALEST. STUD. 71–91 (1989) (Describes
the State’s policy of eviction and disconnecting Bedouin from their land).
172 See Terra Tolley, Rising Voices: Bedouin Youth Navigating
Education and the Future amidst Protracted Conflict, 2015 (Citing Stewart
2011, Bedouin vs. Israel’s Bulldozers, THE INDEPENDENT).
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Siyag. 173 Planning and urbanization policy went hand-inhand with the goal of land dispossession. 174 This policy
aimed for placing “the maximum number of [Bedouin]
on a minimum amount of land and [dispensing] a
minimum number of Jews on a maximum amount of
land.” 175 One particular part of the State policy would
transform the Bedouin into an urbanized society of a few
small towns. 176 Moshe Dayan, an Israeli leader and the
former Israeli Minister of Agriculture, expressed his
view and even wished to eradicate Bedouin culture
altogether by settling them in permanent villages and
transforming them into an urban people. 177 In an
interview with Haaretz newspaper, Dayan stated:
We should transform the Bedouin into an urban
proletariat in industry, services, construction, and
agriculture…Eighty-eight percent of the Israeli
populations are not farmers; let the Bedouins be like them.
Indeed, this would be a radical move which means that the
Bedouin would not live in this land with his herds, but
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would become an urban person who comes home in the
afternoon and put his slippers on . . . the children would go
to school with their hair properly combed. This would be
a revolution, but it may be fixed within two generations.
Without coercion but with government direction. . . this
phenomenon of the Bedouin will disappear. 178

Planning and zoning laws were influential tools
to prevent the Bedouin from returning and using their
land. Especially, the Planning and Building Law of
1965 179 is used to evict many of Bedouin from their land,
relocate them to townships, and strip them of their
land. 180 The Law authorizes the State to use a speedy
process of administrative orders to demolish any house
or building in areas not designated for residential
housing. 181 At the same time, the State designated all
Bedouin villages as nonresidential areas preventing any
planning or development in Bedouin villages except the
recognized townships.
These acts of dislocation continue to affect
Bedouin land rights to this day, because they enable the
State to practice different policies to evict or displace the
Bedouin from their land. For example, the 2008
Goldberg Committee, a government committee that was
formed to address ongoing Bedouin land claims, stated
in its report that Bedouin who were not in possession of

178
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their land (i.e., living on their land or cultivating it) were
not eligible for any land substitute as part of their
compensation. 182 Instead, the Committee offered those
Bedouin monetary compensation only, a type of
compensation the Bedouin have rejected for a long
time. 183
The Bedouin who lost possession of their land
also lost their ability to bargain for land recognition or
land compensation. 184 Significantly, the State law does
not recognize Bedouin land rights; therefore, Bedouin
cannot seek any judicial relief through the State judicial
system; the only way to force the state to compensate
them is through keeping their ground (i.e., possessing the
land). 185
Additionally, the plan to concentrate the Bedouin
in the Siyag zone drastically deteriorated Bedouin living
conditions. To protect their possession of land, many

182
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184 See e.g. Ministry of Construction & Housing, supra note 22 (The
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185 See Morad Elsana, DISPUTES THAT TAKE THE LIVES OF YOUTH IN THE
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Bedouins have been compelled to live in their
unrecognized villages, sacrificing their standard of living
and their basic rights due to limitations on housing rights,
employment, and livestock grazing. 186 In these villages,
Israel refuses to provide plans to recognize Bedouin
villages or provide home building permits, running
water, electricity, education, or health services. 187 When
the Bedouin challenge this policy by building homes, the
State reacts with home demolition orders: it destroys
every new Bedouin home, files criminal charges, and
punishes Bedouin with prison time, and heavy fines. 188
3. The Goldberg Committee and its Report: Concentration
is the Ultimate Plan

Despite all of the State’s efforts, Israel still found
many Bedouin unwilling to yield their land. 189 In 2007,
another committee was convened to deal with the
situation in Bedouin. 190 The Goldberg Committee was

186 See Ahmad Amara, The Negev Land Question: Between Denial and
Recognition, 42 J. PALEST. STUD. 27–47, 29 (2013).
187 The State of Israel has been refusing to recognize the majority of
Bedouin villages.
188 Referencing the history of Alaraqib Bedouin village that was
demolished more than 150 times.
189 See Harriet Sherwood, The Israelis Keep Bulldozing Their Village,
But Still The Bedouin Will Not Give Up Their Land | Harriet Sherwood,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
1,
2011),
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/01/israelisdemolish-bedouin-village.
190 See Ahmad Amara, The Goldberg Committee: Legal and Extralegal Means to Solving the Naqab Bedouins Case, HAGAR STUDIES IN
CULTURE POLITY AND IDENTITIES (2008).
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established for many reasons. 191 Some reasons related to
the Bedouin struggle and their living conditions, while
other reasons related to Israel’s settlement project and
policy of land control, including Israel’s plan to transfer
military facilities from the center of the State, near TelAviv, to the Negev. 192 Additionally, the strengthening
Bedouin struggle and the growing appearance of
Bedouin issues in national and international media
shamed and embarrassed Israel. 193 In some cases, the
visible struggle even changed and impeded Israel’s
settlement plans. 194
In the past two decades, the Bedouin struggle for
their rights was notably strengthened. 195 Several national
and international organizations started to work for the
Bedouin cause and advocate for their rights. 196 The
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organizations began to submit petitions to local courts,
the Supreme Court, and other tribunals, file reports to
international bodies, and approach local and
international media to raise awareness of Bedouin issues,
including their living conditions, unrecognized villages,
and land dispossession. 197 Human rights organizations
started to urge Israel to provide basic services to Bedouin
in the unrecognized villages, such as health services,
education, infrastructure such as roads, and electricity
for schools. 198 When Israel refused these services, the
organizations submitted petitions to courts and litigated
for Bedouin rights. 199 In many cases, they succeeded in
forcing Israel to establish health clinics, build schools,
pave roads, and provide many other rights and
services. 200
On the planning and building level, many NGOs,
along with community leaders, challenged Israel’s
planning policy. 201 Through several Supreme Court

https://auislandora.wrlc.org/islandora/object/thesesdissertations%3A95/dat
astream/PDF/view.
197 See id.
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 See, e.g., HC 786/04, Ahlam el-Sana v. Ministry of Health
(unpublished manuscript) (2004) (Isr.) (petition for family health clinics in
Laqiya and Hura in the Naqab).
201 See HCJ 6672/00, Jazi Abu Kaf v. Minister of the Interior PD
(2000) (Isr.); Pador 02-2-790, 2 TAKDIM ELION 2002(3), 2935 (dismissing
a petition to prevent the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Omer
Municipality that would encompass the land of Bedouin villages of Tarabin
and Mkemen).
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petitions, NGOs managed to get decisions that canceled
the expansion of the master plans of some Jewish towns
that aimed to annex lands that belonged to Bedouin
villages. 202 In other petitions, NGOs succeeded in
freezing parts of the National Master Plan that ignored
the Bedouin villages. 203 which ignore the Bedouin
villages. Further, the organizations were able to get a
decision that required the National Planning and
Building Council to amend the Master Plan in a way that
must take into account the existence of Bedouin villages
in future planning. 204 These achievements forced the
State to take the Bedouin villages into consideration
when planning the Beer-Sheva Metropolitan Plan. 205
In January 2008, the Minister of Construction
and Housing (MOCH) appointed a committee of eight
members, headed by emeritus Supreme Court Justice
Eliezer Goldberg. 206 However, instead of focusing on the
Bedouin development problems, the Committee focused
on additional ways to evict and displace the Bedouin
from the unrecognized villages to the Bedouin townships

202

See id.
Known in Hebrew as tama 4/14.
204 See HCJ 1991/00 Abu-Hamad vs. the National Planning Council
PD (2007) (Isr.); TAKDIM ELION 2007(3), 2542.
205 See id.
206 See Shahar Ilan & Yanir Yagna, Committee: Government Should
Formally Recognize Bedouin Villages in Negev, HAARETZ (2008),
http://www.haaretz.com/news/committee-gov-t-should-formallyrecognize-bedouin-villages-in-negev-1.259322.
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and settle their land claims. 207 The Bedouins disputed the
composition of the Goldberg Committee because six of
the eight members were Jews who represented the
Israel’s interests. 208 Two Bedouin representatives were
appointed by the minister, but these members were
affiliated with the government cause rather than Bedouin
rights. 209 Neither of the members came from Bedouin
NGOs or Bedouin rights groups. 210
The Goldberg Committee issued a report after a
year-long process of deliberations, during which the
Committee heard from State officials, representatives
from local and international organizations, and some
Bedouins who did not boycott the Committee. 211 In
November 2008, a report was submitted to the Israeli
Prime Minister that drew up general guidelines and
recommendations for the government on how to deal
with Bedouin settlement. 212 Although the report is the
first official document to recognize the historical

207

See Ahmad Amara, The Battle for the Land and Housing Rights of
the
Negev
Bedouin,
http://www.academia.edu/235048/The_Battle_for_the_Land_and_Housin
g_Rights_of_the_Negev_Bedouin (last visited Feb. 6, 2013).
208 See id.
209 See id.
210 See id.
211 See Ahmad Amara, The Goldberg Committee: Legal and Extralegal Means to Solving the Naqab Bedouins Case, HAGAR STUDIES IN
CULTURE
POLITY
AND
IDENTITIES
(2008),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269141091_The_Goldberg_Com
mittee_Legal_and_extralegal_means_of_solving_the_Naqab_Bedouin_case.
212 See Ministry of Construction & Housing, supra note 22 at 31–2.
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injustices imposed upon the Bedouin, the
recommendations did not meet the minimum
expectations of the Bedouin community. 213
According
to
leading
human
rights
organizations, the Goldberg Committee failed to
recognize Bedouin land rights and did not suggest any
solution. 214 Instead, it suggested similar mechanisms and
methods that had failed in the past. 215 The Committee
even added new methods and mechanisms that further
discriminate against Bedouin and deprive them of some
of their compensation rights, namely ownership of 20%
of their land. 216 As for the recognition of Bedouin
villages, the Committee failed to specify clear
recommendations. 217 Instead, it suggested that only
villages with a sufficient population in locations that do
not conflict with other plans could be recognized. 218
Ultimately, the Committee’s report did not suggest any
major change for the Bedouin problem and did not
propose any substantial solution for any of the three
issues in conflict: recognition of Bedouin land,
recognition of their villages, or demolition of their

213

See Elsana, supra note 196.
See id.
215See id.
216 See id.
217 See id.
218See Etta Prince-Gibson, The Bedouin Dilemma, MOMENT
MAGAZINE (2019) https://www.momentmag.com/bedouin-dilemma/.
214
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houses. 219 The report was a disappointment in regard to
Bedouin land rights, recognition of their villages, and
demolition of their homes. 220
Furthermore, many Bedouins consider the
Report to be the major source of their current troubles.221
It accelerated he process of the Bedouin land
confiscation, supported the policy of house demolition,
and encouraged the uprooting their villages. 222 Most
importantly, it established the platform for the Prawer
Plan, which was used to execute the recommendations of
the Goldberg Committee. 223 These recommendations

219 See Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages in the Negev,
Principles Paper Submitted to the Committee for Bedouin Settlement in the
Negev, GOLDBERG COMMITTEE (Feb. 7, 2008) (copy on file with author).
220 See Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages in the Negev,
A Response to Goldberg Commission Report (Dec. 28, 2008) (copy on file
with author).
221 See Harriet Sherwood, Bedouin’s Plight:‘We Want to Maintain Our
Traditions. But It’s A Dream Here’, THE GUARDIAN (2011)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/03/bedouin-plighttraditions-threat-israel.
222 See Ben Fargeon & Michal Rotem, Enforcing Distress: House
Demolition Policy in the Bedouin Community in the Negev, NEGEV
COEXISTENCE
FORUM
FOR
CIVIL
EQUALITY
(2016),
https://www.dukium.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/HDR_2016_ENG1.pdf.
223
See The Arab Bedouin in the Unrecognized Villages in the Naqab
(Negev): Between the Hammer of Prawer and the Anvil of Goldberg,
ADALAH’S
NEWSLETTER,
(Apr.
2011),

https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/upfiles/2011/Thabet_Engl
ish_2.pdf.
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causes the eviction of the Bedouin from their villages
and confiscation of their land. 224
4. The Prawer Plan

Later, in the same year, Israel established another
team to examine the execution of the committee’s
recommendations and suggested guidelines for a policy
on the Bedouin settlement in the new townships,
including their land claim settlements. 225
The
government also asked the Committee to provide
recommendations on policies to regulate the Bedouin
settlement and provide proposals for new legislation for
this matter. 226
In 2009, a short time after the Goldberg
Committee’s Report, the government established the
Prawer Committee, headed by Ehud Prawer, the former
deputy chairman of the National Security Council.227

224

See id.
Recommendations of the Implementation Team for the
Goldberg Report for the Regulation of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev
ISRAEL PMO, ( המלצות צוות היישום לדו"ח גולדברג להסדרת התיישבות הבדואים
)בנגב,
http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/hevra/Documents/goldberg1012.pd
f (last visited Aug. 19, 2017).
226 PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, The Establishment of a Commission to
Draft Policy for Regulating Bedouin Settlement in the Negev,
http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/GovDecisions/2007/Pages/des2491.aspx
(last visited July 10, 2017).
227See
The
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Plan
and
Analysis
(2011),
https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/upfiles/2011/Overview%20and%
225See
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The government asked the Committee to prepare a plan
for the implementation of the Goldberg Committee’s
recommendations, which include: 228 (1) the settlement
of Bedouin land claims; (2) the planning of new towns
for Bedouin; and (3) the enforcement of the law in regard
to the Bedouin illegal house construction (i.e. house
demolition). 229
In May 2011, the Prawer Committee submitted
its recommendations in a report known as the Prawer
Report. 230 The Report suggested new compensation
offers for Bedouin claimants. 231 It distinguished the
compensation of the Bedouin for claims of possessed
land, land designated as agricultural land, and
unpossessed land (Bedouin have to give up possession of
the land, which means they have to evacuate their

20Analysis%20of%20the%20Prawer%20Committee%20Report%20Reco
mmendations%20Final.pdf.
228 See The Arab Bedouin in the Unrecognized Villages in the Naqab
(Negev): Between the Hammer of Prawer and the Anvil of Goldberg,
ADALAH’S NEWSLETTER, (2011), http://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/u
pfiles/2011/Thabet_English_2.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
229 See Anat Raskin, Shel Me Hadamah Hazu? Baekvot Doah Prawer
Lehasdarat Hahityashvout Habedouit Banegev [Whose Land? Following
The Prawer Report On The Regulation Of Bedouin Settlement In The
Negev], MEZRAH, http://www.goarad.co.il/?pid=15&t=mFinal&L1=41&L
2=144&item=1847 (last visited July 10, 2017).
230See Ze’ev Binyamin “Benny” Begin, Regulating Bedouin
Settlement
in
the
Negev
Report,
http://www.pmo.gov.il/BranchesAndUnits/beduin/Documents/DOCHbegi
n.PDF (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
231 See id.
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land). 232 Regarding only possessed land, the Report
suggested offering Bedouin claimants parcels of land up
to 50% of their claimed land as compensation. 233 As
discussed supra, during the last sixty years, Israel
displaced most of the Bedouin from their land and
deprived their possession; therefore, the number of
current landholders is very small. 234 For claims
regarding land not possessed by claimants, which is the
majority of Bedouin claimants, the Report suggested
only offering Bedouin monetary compensation. 235 This
means depriving this group of any part of their land as
compensation. 236
With respect to the issue of planning
arrangements for Bedouin settlements and recognition of
Bedouin villages, the Report stated: “solutions for the
existing population will be in the existing seven
government-planned townships, in the Abu Basma
villages (or by expanding the jurisdiction of such

232

See Israeli Land Authority Destroys Bedouin Fields In Negev,
MA’AN NEWS AGENCY (2014), http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?i
d=671036.
233See
INTER-MINISTERIAL TEAM TO IMPLEMENT REPORT
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATING BEDOUIN SETTLEMENT- FURTHER
DISCUSSION AND TRANSFER OF ACTIVITIES FROM ONE OFFICE SPACE, PRIME
MINISTER’S OFFICE, http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/GovDecisions/2011/
Pages/des3707.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
234 See Israeli Land Authority Destroys Bedouin Fields In Negev,
MA’AN NEWS AGENCY, (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.maannews.com/Conte
nt.aspx?id=671036.
235
See id.
236 See id.
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villages), and in new settlements.” 237 In this regard, the
Report suggests beginning a process of planning that
would cover the total Bedouin population in the
unrecognized villages. 238 The process of the settlement
regulation would include planning expansions for the
existing towns to absorb the additional Bedouin
concentrations, and establishing new townships as
deemed necessary. 239
With regard to recognition of new Bedouin
villages, the Report set a high bar of requirements for
recognition. 240 It stated: “[T]he establishment of new
settlements is contingent upon the ‘criteria of population
density and continuity’, as well as ‘an examination of
size and economic capacity.’” 241 For years, similar
criteria have prevented the recognition of Bedouin
villages. 242 The Report also included several other

237 See A Report of the Inter-Ministerial Team for the Implementation
of the Recommendations to Regulate Bedouin Settlement in the Negev
(hereinafter
Prawer
Report),
Art.
2.5.2,
(2011),
http://moch.gov.il/Gov_Decisions/Pages/GovDecision.aspx?ListID=f33e0
a4b-aa35-4b12-912e-d271a6476a11&WebId=fe384cf7-21cd-49eb-8bbb71ed64f47de0&ItemID=289 (last visited July 10, 2017).
238 See id.
239 Concentrations are the unrecognized Bedouin villages, as the State
prefers to call them.
240 See The Arab Bedouin in the Unrecognized Villages in the Naqab
(Negev): Between the Hammer of Prawer and the Anvil of Goldberg,
ADALAH’S NEWSLETTER, http://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/upfiles/2
011/Thabet_English_2.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
241
Prawer Report, supra note 237.
242 See id.
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elements like a strict timetable and strict implementation
of rules to ensure completion. 243 Additionally, the
proposal includes “a plan for the economic development
and growth of [the] Bedouin population in the
Negev.” 244
Many human right organizations believe that the
results of the Prawer Plan would be disastrous for the
Bedouin if implemented, since the plan suggests the
eviction of the majority of the Bedouin from their
villages in the Negev. 245 The Report reveals that only
one-third of the Bedouin of the unrecognized villages
will remain in their current places, while two-thirds will
be uprooted from their villages and resettled in other
Bedouin towns. 246 The Report proposed to displace
nearly 20,000 to 30,000 Bedouins from their villages and
transfer them to other Bedouin towns such as Rahat,
Kseifa, and Hura. 247 Many villages such as Assir,

243

See id.
Id. at 32-34.
245See
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Plan
and
Analysis,
https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/upfiles/2011/Overview%20and%
20Analysis%20of%20the%20Prawer%20Committee%20Report%20Reco
mmendations%20Final.pdf.
246 See id.
247 See Zafrir Rinat, Israel Approves Plan to Relocate 30,000 Bedouin
from Unrecognized Villages, HAARETZ, (Sept. 11, 2011),
http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/israel-approves-plan-to-relocate30-000-bedouin-from-unrecognized-villages-1.383772.
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Alssera, and Um Alhiran—with respective populations
of 1500, 1000, and 500—would be demolished. 248
Additionally, the plan suggested implementing a
new segregation protocol in the Negev. 249 It arranges for
Bedouin settlements within a clearly demarcated and
separate region in the Negev; it separates the Bedouin
population from the rest of the State’s population. 250
250F

After the Report’s publication, many right wing
political parties protested against the plan. 251 They
claimed that the government was giving out the Negev
to the Bedouin. 252 As a result of the amounting pressure
from these right wing political groups, Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the National Security
Advisor, Jacob Amidror, to review the Report.253
Accordingly, Amidror reviewed the plans and made

248
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(Soshana
London
Sappir
trans.),
https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/eng/publications/Nomads%20Ag
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24, 2016).
249 See id.
250 See id.
251 See Ronen Medzini, On The Way To Approval: Large Cut in Lands
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2016),
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several amendments that affect the location of the
resettlement, land ownership claims, and the amount of
compensation. 254 Amidror’s amendments further
decreased the area designated for the Bedouin
settlement. 255 He state “no land [compensation] will be
given to Bedouin and no Bedouin settlement will be
planned west of Highway 40.” 256
In addition, Amidror’s amendments decreased
the amount of land the Bedouin were supposed to receive
as part of their compensation as claimants. 257 The
amendment specifies that the proposed arrangement
would only apply to Bedouin who filed a lawsuit prior to
October 1979, and whose claims were not rejected by the
Land Settlement Officer or the court. 258 Another
amendment provides that the proposed arrangement will
apply only to land, which the Bedouins held and
cultivated, rather than claims for grazing lands, which
constitute most of the claimed land. 259 Further, the
amendments held that the determination of land area for
purposes of providing compensation shall be made

254

See id.
See id.
256 Medzini, supra note 251.
257 See The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, TEL AVIV
HEADQUARTERS
(Oct.
2011),
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CESCR/Shared%20Documents/ISR/I
NT_CESCR_NGO_ISR_47_9137_E.doc.
258 See id.
259 See Ahmad Amara, The Negev Land Question: Between Denial and
Recognition, 42 INST. FOR PALESTINE STUDIES, 4 (2013),
https://www.palestine-studies.org/jps/fulltext/162935.
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according to evidence of cultivation of the land, or living
on the land close to the time of filing the original claim,
provided that the land was not held at that time or in the
future by the State. 260
Bedouin, who earlier objected to the Prawer Plan,
claimed that Amidror’s amendments made the proposal
totally unacceptable, mainly because the amendments
dramatically reduced the land Bedouin could get in
compensation as part of the land settlement. 261 The
original Prawer Plan proposed an area of 45,220 acres
(183,000 dunams) for Bedouin living in the
unrecognized villages in exchange for settlement of their
land claims, but after the amendments, the area was
reduced by almost half. 262
In summary, the Prawer Plan outlines
implementation of the Goldberg Commission Report to
deal with the Bedouin settlement issue in the
unrecognized villages, rather than recognizing their
villages. The Plan was prepared without any consultation
with Bedouins of the unrecognized villages, and it could

260

See Rinat Zafrir, Ben-Gurion Government Recognized Bedouin
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Rights, HAARETZ,
(last visited Jul 10, 2017).
261 See Elsana, supra note 196.
262 See Rinat Zafrir, Israel Approves Plan to Relocate 30,000 Bedouin
From
Unrecognized
Villages,
HAARETZ.COM,
(2011),
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2017) (noting that Bedouin representatives define the program “a
declaration of war on the Bedouin.”).
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lead to the uprooting of tens of thousands of Bedouin
from their homes. 263
5. The Legislative Method of Land Dispossession and the
Ordinance Regime

On the legislative level, after the establishment of
Israel, it was less acceptable than it had been during the
War, but also illegal, to evict the Bedouin, who became
citizens of the State from their villages. 264 Therefore, the
State began using another, less aggressive, and more
politically acceptable means to evict the Bedouin from
their lands: the law. Thus, the State started relying more
on legislation in order to continue to the “wholesale
takeover” of Bedouin lands. 265 Legislation not only
enabled the dispossession of Bedouin land but also
legitimized the dispossession in legal terms and in eyes
of many Israeli citizens and international community. 266.
These legislations can be divided into two groups. The
first group were national/general laws, which applied to
all the Arabs in Israel, facilitated the dispossession of
Bedouin land as part of the general policy of Arab lands

263
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FUND
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(Sept.
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(last
visited July 10, 2017).
264 See Elsana, supra note 196.
265 See id.
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dispossession. 267 These laws include the Absentee
Property Law (1950) and the Land Acquisition Law
(1953). 268 The second group of laws, which this Article
focuses on, specifically focused on Bedouin land
dispossession, including: The Land Rights Settlement
Ordinance (1969), the Negev Land Acquisition Act
(Peace Treaty with Egypt) of 1980 (The Peace Law), and
the Public Land Law (Trespasser Eviction) of 1981
(Amendment 2005). 269
This second group of laws, especially Land
Rights Settlement Ordinance (1969), “created the
‘alleged’ mechanism and framework for the
investigation for Bedouin land rights,” 270 which resulted
in the dispossession of most of their land, and continue
to serve for such purpose. 271

267

See Joshua Weisman, The Land Law, 1969: A Critical Analysis, 5
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REV.,
379
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available
at
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268 See Land Acquisition Law, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 190, 170-182 (Isr.).
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ISSACHAR ROSEN-ZVI, TAKING SPACE SERIOUSLY: LAW, SPACE,
AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY ISRAEL 46 (2004) (they created a “complex
web of legal mechanisms that imposed insurmountable procedural and
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B. LAND RIGHTS SETTLEMENT ORDINANCE OF 1969

The Land Rights Settlement Ordinance (1969) is
the first major legislation that disproportionately
impacted Bedouin land rights. 272 During the late 1970s,
as part of Israel’s policy of land registration, the State
legislated the Ordinance to register and determine the
ownership of land in Israel. 273 As part of this procedure,
Israel initiated a process for settling all Bedouin land
claims. 274
The Bedouins filed 3,220 land-title settlement
lawsuits asking the State to recognize their land
ownership for about 245,000 acres of land. 275 Many
Bedouin, however, were excluded from this process.
The Alazazimah tribes, for example, who owned about
55,500 acres, located in Sahl-Albagar (Har-Hanegev
region), were prevented from filing land settlement
claims due to the fact that the State had previously
expropriated their land for military needs. 276 In this lone
step, the State dispossessed about 20% of Bedouin
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land. 277 Thus, as several scholars indicate the Bedouin
land claims reached as many as 300,000 acres. 278
Surprisingly, all of the 3,220 Bedouin land
settlement claims were rejected by the Land Settlement
Officer. 279 Therefore, per the Ordinance requirement, the
Settlement Officer forwarded all Bedouin lawsuits to the
District Court for final judgment. 280 The Settlement
Officer claimed that the Bedouin do not possess the
required documents, namely British or Ottoman title
deeds to prove their land ownership. 281 The Land
Settlement Officer refused to accept the Bedouin’s
traditional documentation, such as contracts for land
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https://www.adalah.org/uploads/uploads/Adalah_Position_Paper_Prawer_
II_23.1.2017.pdf.
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forward it for the District Court, for a final decision).
281 See Land and Housing Rights Violations in Israel’s Unrecognized
OFF
THE
MAP,
Bedouin
Villages,
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/03/30/map/land-and-housing-rightsviolations-israels-unrecognized-bedouin-villages (last visited Mar. 23,
2019).

2019

SYSTEMATIC INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND DISPOSSESSION

55

purchase (Sanadat) and other evidence as sufficient
proof of their land rights. 282
When Bedouin reached the District Court, as part
of their appeal, it as well, rejected their lawsuits and
refused to recognize any of their land rights, thus they
appealed to the High Court. 283 The High Court also
rejected their land claims and ordered the land to be
registered under the name of the State. 284 In the
precedential case of the Alhawashelah v. State of Israel,
the High Court rejected the appeal and decided that
Bedouin land was Mawat land, 285 and thus ruled that
Bedouin lands were to be registered as State land,
indicating that the Bedouin had no legal right to the
land. 286 Since Alhawashelah is case precedent, all courts
have rejected all subsequent Bedouin land claims. 287 To
this day, no court has ruled in favor of Bedouin claimants
for a single land-claim lawsuit. 288
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285 See CA 218/74 Salim El-Huashlla v. State of Israel (Alhawashelah)
38(3) PD 141 (1974) (Isr.).
286 See HCJ 84/83 El-Wakili v. State of Israel 37(4) PD 173 (1983)
(Isr.).
287 See Ron Kelley, Israel's Bedouin: The End of Poetry, AM. FOR
MIDDLE EAST UNDERSTANDING (AMEU) 3 (1998) (“To date, no Bedouin
has ever won a land claim. This includes some 3,000 lawsuits by the
Bedouin over the past two decades.”).
288 See Palestinian Bedouin IDPs, Ongoing Displacement and Land
Rights: Israel Poisons Bedouin Land in Abda Unrecognized Villages, AL
MAJDAL 37 (2003) (reporting that no Bedouin has ever won a land claim to
283
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1. The Ordinance Regime: The Effect of Legislation

Indeed, the laws that Israel passed created a new
regime for Bedouin land dispossession, but among the
many laws, the Land Rights Settlement Ordinance is
particularly notable. 289 The Ordinance eliminates the
previous land regime, introduces a new regime that
regulates Bedouin land, and effectively ensures Bedouin
land dispossession. 290 Instead of settlement and land title
registration, the Ordinance initiated a new process that
established the basic legal elements that ensured the
long-term dispossession of Bedouin lands. 291 Through
sophisticated and extraordinary steps, the Ordinance
established new rules for land settlement claims,
determined the jurisdiction of courts, and articulated the
applicable law for the land settlement process. 292
The administrative and legal steps that the
Ordinance requires for Bedouin land claims is
challenging for most Bedouin. 293 It requires them to
submit a “land title settlement claim” to the Land Rights

any of the more than 3000 lawsuits filed over 50 years, and this places the
burden of proof regarding Bedouin land claims on Bedouin).
289 See DAVID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL
(1990).
290 See Elsana, supra note 196.
291 See id.
292See id. (It started by describing the process, defining the settlement
areas, and drafting the orders and notices for the towns).
293 See Land Rights Settlement Ordinance (Revised), 5729- 1969, 13
OSI 293, 293, Art. 17 (Isr.).
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Settlement Officer (part of the Ministry of Justice).294
Then, the Land Settlement Officer investigates and
assesses the claims. 295 If the Officer approves the claim,
he registers the land in the name of the Bedouin
claimant. 296 However, when the Officer rejects the
lawsuit, he declares it a disputed claim and transfers the
case to the District Court for a final judgment. 297
According to the Ordinance, only the Court is authorized
to settle disputes concerning land rights and to make
final decisions that dismiss their land claim. 298 Article
17(a) of the Ordinance states: “[u]pon publishing a
settlement notification in a town, every person who
claims land rights shall appear [in court]. . . and submit
his memorandum of claim in the prescribed form.”299
Articles 43 and 44 of the Ordinance determine both the
appropriate court jurisdiction and the applicable law to
be applied where there is a dispute between claimants.300
Relying on the claim that the Bedouin do not hold
any land rights, the Ordinance requires Bedouins to go

294

Id.
See id. at Art. 22.
296 See id.
297 See id. at Art. 53.
298 See id. at Art. 43 (“The court only is authorized to hear and
adjudicate any dispute about land in a settlement area, and if there were
conflicting claims between two or more plaintiffs, the settlement officer
shall transfer the dispute to court.”)
299 Id. at Art. 17(a).
300 See id. at Art. 43, 44 (Article 43 of the Ordinance provides that only
courts shall have jurisdiction over disputes regarding land settlement, and if
there are any conflicting claims between two or more claimants, the Land
Settlement Officer shall transfer the dispute to court).
295
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through a legal process to prove their rights. 301 The
Ordinance disregards Bedouin traditional land rights and
sets the platform for the policy of land dispossession in
the Negev. 302 The Ordinance ignores customary law or
land rights based on international customary law. 303
The Ordinance establishes a set of rules that
ensure the supremacy of the State and the inferiority of
Bedouin legal rights. 304 It supports Israel’s legal position
and undermines the Bedouin’s position. 305 Specifically,
Article 135 of the Ordinance “classifies all [M]awat
lands as State property, unless formal legal title could be
produced.” 306 Since the State classifies Bedouin land as
Mawat land, it essentially classifies, or considers
Bedouin land as State property. 307 Such articles give a
clear privilege to the State over Bedouin claimants and
facilitate the expropriation of their land by legal
means. 308
Further, the Ordinance preserves the State’s right
to object to any Bedouin claim without requiring that the

301

See Elsana, supra note 196, at 58.
See id.
303 See Land Rights Settlement Ordinance, supra note 293.
304 See Elsana, supra note 196, at 58.
305 See id.
306 Tawfiq S. Rangwala, Inadequate Housing, Israel, and the Bedouin
of the Negev, 42 OSGOODE HALL LAW J. 415, 440–41 (2004).
307 See PLIA ALBECK, DOAH MESAKEM SHEL TZEVET HAMOMHIM LEANYAN
HESDER MEKARKIEN EZOR HASYAG HANGEV HTSFONI [REPORT OF THE TEAM OF
EXPERTS ON THE ISSUE OF LAND SETTLEMENT IN THE SIYAG AREA AND THE
NORTHERN NEGEV], ISR. MINISTRY OF JUST. (Oct. 20, 1975).
308 See Elsana, supra note 196, at 58.
302
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State prove any rights or connection to the Bedouin
land. 309 Article 22 of the Ordinance adds “[t]he State’s
rights in land shall be investigated and will be settled
whether officially sued or not, all rights in land that have
not been proven by other claims shall be registered in the
name of the State.” 310 In addition, Article 53 grants the
State the ultimate right to object to the settlement of title
claims. 311 The Article states:
[i]f an objection was filed in one of the matters
mentioned in Articles 51 and 52, the Settlement Officer
shall transfer the matter to the court, and the court may
order the registration of the possessor as the owner of the
land, if it finds that the mentioned conditions were met. 312

In traditional legal procedure, the party who
claims rights against the possessor generally submits the
claim, serves as the plaintiff, and proves his claim.313
The new order, however, reverses the traditional rule. 314
Instead of asking the state (to submit a claim and prove
it) it requires the Bedouin—who possess the land—to
submit the claim, serve as the plaintiff, and carry the
burden of proof. 315

309

See id. at 59.
See Land Rights Settlement Ordinance, supra note 293.
311 See id. at Art. 53.
312 Id.
313 See Elsana, supra note 4, 354-57 (Oct. 2017).
314
See id.
315 See id. at 351.
310

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

60

VOL. 15.2

According to Article 43 of the Ordinance, for
either side to be able to own the land, both the Bedouin
and the State must prove their rights. 316 Under Article 45
of the Ordinance, when neither the Bedouin nor the State
agrees to serve as plaintiff, the court decides which side
should be the plaintiff and subsequently bear the burden
of proof. 317 In Bedouin land cases, however, the
Ordinance changes the traditional order and demands the
Bedouin plaintiffs to submit lawsuits for land
settlement. 318 Then, the State then summons the Bedouin
to court and, once again, forces them to serve as plaintiff
and carry the burden of proof. 319
The Ordinance also transforms the status of the
Bedouin people from “owners of land,” or “possessors
of land,” to “claimants of land,” or “claimants for land
rights.” 320 This transformation has a tremendous effect
on Bedouin land adjudication in courts, which results in
a long, complicated legal process that denies Bedouin

316

See Land Rights Settlement Ordinance, supra note 293 at Art. 43.
See id. at Art. 45.
318 See id. at Art 43 (The Bedouin must defend their land in court. If
they do not appear in court, they automatically lose their claims and their
land).
319 Many Bedouins were surprised to find that when they came to
defend their land they were summoned to court as plaintiffs rather than
defendants. Some Bedouins did not know about the claims their parents had
submitted filed in the land registry long time before legal action had been
taken by the State.
320 See Land Rights Settlement Ordinance, supra note 293 at Art.
17(a).
317
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land rights. 321 The process requires Bedouins who appeal
for land ownership to prove their rights, while those who
agree to accept compensation are not required to do
so. 322 In other words, the process denies the recognition
of land rights for those who insist on asking courts to
recognize their land ownership, while at the same time,
recognizes land ownership for those who agree to sell
their land to the State. In latter cases, the State
recognizes Bedouin rights mainly based on their
traditional law. 323 The State’s “acceptable paradox” does
not find any representation in the legal process. 324 Such
changes contradict basic rules of due process and law of
evidence (rules of evidence), delay adjudication, and
prevent Bedouins from effectively bringing forth
evidence to prove their claims.
A careful analysis of the situation on a macro
level reveals that the State, rather than the Bedouin,
deserves to serve as the plaintiff. The State is the party
that acts and behaves as the plaintiff in the general
adjudicatory process. The State is the one interested in
obtaining or acquiring rights through the legal process;
It claims rights against the Bedouin who is in possession

321

Compare Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title,
Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2006) (explaining
the land settlement dispute between the Onieda Indian Nation and New
York’s non-Indian citizens).
322 See Land Rights Settlement Ordinance, supra note 293 at Art. 43.
323 See Morad Elsana, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' Land:
Application of the Customary Land Rights Model on the Arab-Bedouin Case
in Israel, 7 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRIT. RACE. PERSP. 45, 61 (2015).
324
See Elsana, supra note 196.
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of the land. 325 The State claims rights, summons
Bedouins to court, and controls the legal process, while
the Bedouin (defined as the plaintiff) behave as
defendants and attempt to defend their rights in court.
Also, in the land settlements process, the State is the
party who initiates the legal process and forces the
Bedouin to file their claims. In the 1970s the State forced
the Bedouin to file land title settlement claims; in 2003,
the State filed counterclaims and forced the Bedouin to
adjudicate their land settlement claims in court.326
Therefore, the State, rather than the Bedouin, should
serve as the plaintiff and carry the burden of proof.
Israel’s control of the legal process is another
factor that should be taken into consideration. The State
decides when to start the process, when to freeze it, and
against which tribe or tribes to submit claims. The State
controls many important elements of the process such as
the time passed, and the statutes of limitation. Only
through colonial “legal magic” does the impossible
become possible against indigenous peoples. 327 The
timing of such acts proves to have a tremendous effect
on the Bedouin claims, since it defines and controls the
ability of the Bedouin to provide evidence and call
witnesses to court. These limitations eventually lead to
the Bedouin’s inability to prove their cases.

325

See generally Kent McNeil, The Onus of Proof of Aboriginal Title,
37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 775, 776 (1999).
326 See Morad Elsana, The Role of the Judiciary in Dispossessing
Indigenous Peoples’, AM J. JURIS. 333, 350-51 (2018).
327 See Elsana, supra note 323 at 61.
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One blatant example of how the State
undermines the Bedouin position can be found in Israel’s
ability to delay adjudication of Bedouin land claims for
a long time. The State has kept Bedouin claims pending
for about forty years after the Land Settlement Process
began in the early 1970s. That delay is one of the
elements that severely undermined the Bedouin’s ability
to bring evidence, especially witnesses, to the court,
particularly because of the Bedouin oral culture328
During the delay, many Bedouin claimants lost the
ability to prove their land rights due to the death of many
claimants and witnesses to traditional, pre-State life. 329
Much of the major evidence was lost with them. 330 This
is significant because the Court requires evidence from
1921, the year of the British Mawat Ordinance, or before
to be available. 331 Further, the Ordinance places the
ultimate power to adjudicate Bedouin land in the hands
of the State. 332 The State then abuses that power by
managing and manipulating the process in order to
weaken the Bedouins’ legal position and undermine their
ability to prove their land rights.
Finally, one must notice that Article 44 of the
Ordinance outlines the substantive law courts should
apply when evaluating a land settlement claim, provides
that: (a) A court shall judge by land laws that are in effect

328

See id.
See id.
330 See id. at 62.
331
See id.
332 See id.
329
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during the trial, and take into an account the rights of
real estate by law and by equity. 333 However, despite
this, the state and courts have ignored such options and
insists the Bedouin have no land rights. 334
2.

The Bedouins’ Limited Understanding of the Land Title
Settlement Process

Bedouins’ limited understanding of Israel’s legal
system and of the Hebrew language are other factors that
limit their ability to advocate their land rights, and
indirectly facilitate confiscation of their land. 335 Land
title settlement was an unfamiliar process for the
Bedouin; many of them did not really understand the
process, its goals, or the documents they received from
the Land Registrar Officer, such as application forms for
land claims. 336 Many mistakenly thought that the State
wanted to register their land in the Land Registry to
recognize their ownership. 337 During the process of
submitting the land title settlement applications, the
Bedouin were required to provide evidence of their land
rights, which they did in the form of Sanadat or
witnesses’ statements. 338 They also had to define the

333

See id. at 54.
See id. at 43.
335 See id. at 20.
336 See id. at 57.
337
See id.
338 See id. at 19.
334
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borders and the size of their land. 339 At the end of each
application for land title settlement, they received
official documents signed by the State Officer of the
Land Registration Office, under the Ministry of Justice,
acknowledging receipt of those documents, but not
confirming land ownership. 340 However, many Bedouins
were illiterate and could not read the content of the
documents they received. 341 To this day, some Bedouins
mistakenly think that the application forms or the
confirmation of their traditional documents, that they
receive from the Land Settlement Officer, are Israeli title
deeds for their land. 342 Therefore, many Bedouin
mistakenly refer to the documents as title deeds or
official documents that prove their land ownership. 343
In addition, during the late 1970s, when Israel
started the land settlement process, the Bedouin did not
trust the new State, especially in issues related to their
land. 344 In the beginning, many of them refused to
submit land settlements claims through this process. 345
The State, only after making extraordinary efforts, was
able to convince the Bedouins to submit settlement

339

See id.
See id. at 57.
341 See id.
342 See id. at 58.
343 See id.
344 See id. at 56.
345 See SWIRSKI AND HASSON, supra note 136 at 5 (discussing Bedouin
suspicions and attitudes toward state authorities).
340
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claims. 346 The State also sent officers to tribal leaders to
convince them to submit claims on behalf of their
tribes 347. Furthermore, when such efforts did not suffice,
the State warned the Bedouins about the consequences
of not submitting claims. 348
3. The Government Committee and the Mawat Land
Doctrine

In 1975, Israel appointed a special committee to
inquire into the legal status of Bedouin land rights
(which became known as the Albeck Committee). 349 In
October the same year, the Committee issued its report
about Bedouin land rights. 350 The report stated three
main points: first, all lands of the Negev (Siyag area) are
Mawat lands because when the Ottoman Lands Code of
1858 was published, there was no permanent settlement
in the Negev; second, no Bedouin can acquire any land

346

See Farah Mihlar, Israel's Denial of the Bedouin. BRIEFING
LONDON: MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INT’L. 1, 8 (2011).
347 See Aron Medzini, Bedouin Settlement Policy in Israel: Success or
Failure? HORIZONS GEOGRAPHY 79/80, 37, 39 (2012).
348
See LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL ORDINANCE ART. 5(B)(2) (a
warning of the expected results to a person who does not file his claim at
the required time, and will not delimit the plot he is claiming and the
penalties that are due to him for this failure) (translation).
349 See Ahmad Amara, The Goldberg Committee: Legal and Extralegal Means to Solving the Naqab Bedouins Case, HAGAR STUDIES IN
CULTURE POLITY AND IDENTITIES 8 (2): 227, 229 (2008),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269141091_The_Goldberg_Com
mittee_Legal_and_extralegal_means_of_solving_the_Naqab_Bedouin_case.
350 See id.
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rights, even under possession and continuous cultivation;
third, all Bedouin land is State land. 351
The report further established the principles of
the policy applicable to Bedouin land to this day,
particularly the non-recognition of Bedouin land
ownership. 352 As a result of
the Committee’s
recommendations, the State did not bring any further
Bedouin land claim lawsuits to be adjudicated in courts
until 2003. 353 Instead, “[t]he State started to push the
Bedouin to relinquish their lands by offering them
compensation and convincing them to settle their land
claims through different methods of pressure and
negotiations.” 354
4. Halt on Bedouin Land Settlement 1984-2003 and The
Negev Plan of 2003

Between 1984 and 2003, Israel continued to
refuse to recognize the Bedouin land rights and
continued to expropriate their land when the Bedouin
refused to accept the State’s offers for land settlement. 355
Meanwhile, the majority of Bedouin refused to either
relinquish their lands or settle their land lawsuits.356
Some Bedouin refused as a matter of principle and others

351

See SWIRSKI AND HASSON, supra note 136 at 20–21.
See id. at 21.
353 See Elsana, supra note 4.
354 Id. at 31.
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See id. at 31-32.
356 See id. at 33.
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refused due to inadequate offers of compensation. 357 As
a result, this situation became a deadlock, with no
solution that both the Bedouin and State could accept.
Israel started to claim that the halt in the land rights
settlement process was impeding the development of the
Negev. 358 This created another excuse for the State to
continue to promote more aggressive plans and policies
to end the Bedouin land issue; specifically, the State
pursued adjudicating the Bedouin long-time pending
land settlement lawsuits (completion of the land title
settlement process), obtained favorable decisions in
courts, and disposed the Bedouin land. 359
For many years, Israel claimed the Bedouin land
issue was the main obstacle for the development of the
Negev. 360 In fact, State officials and political leaders
continue to promote the idea that Bedouin land claims
are the main reason behind their refusal to leave their
land and move to settle in the new townships.361 The
State started to claim in the media that solving or
eliminating the land settlement issues is the only way to
develop the Negev. 362

See Havatzelet Yahel, Land Disputes Between the Negev Bedouin
and Israel, 11 ISR. STUD. 1–22, 12 (2006) (stating “from 1978 until 2003
agreed settlements of claims were achieved with regard to over 140,000
dumans, most of them in the area of airfields”).
358 See id. at 8.
359 See id. at 10-12.
360 See ADALAH, supra note 248.
361 See id. at 22-24.
362See
Ghazi Falah, Israeli State Policy Toward Bedouin
Sedentarization in the Negev, 18 J. OF PALESTINE STUDIES, 71–91 (1964).
357
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In 2003, the government decided to confront the
Bedouin issue through the Negev Plan of 2003.363
According to the government, the plan aimed to improve
services and infrastructure in the recognized townships
and to guard the State’s land in the Negev against
Bedouin trespassing or theft. 364 In practice, the plan
sought to relocate Bedouin from their villages into
designated townships and settle Bedouin land claims. 365
Bedouin were also concerned that their land
would be taken from them to serve Jewish development
needs and settlement programs in the Negev, rather than
to serve their own urgent development needs, that have
been ignored for more than sixty years, as it did in Umm
al-Hiran Village, and Azzarnouge. 366 Bedouin claimed
that the main goal of the plan is to evict them from their
land, concentrate them in large towns, and dispossess
them of their land. 367 Therefore, the Bedouin opposed

363
364

2003).

See SWIRSKI AND HASSON, supra note 136 at 12.
See Israeli Government Resolution No. 216 (ARB/I) (14 April

365See

Noam Sharvit, When the State sues Bedouin compromise
Globes, http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?fbdid=1000174638 (last
visited July 10, 2017); SWIRSKI AND HASSON, supra note 136 at 29.
366 See IAN LUSTICK, ARABS IN THE JEWISH STATE: ISRAEL’S CONTROL
OF A NATIONAL MINORITY 50 (1980) (describing the State policy of control
of the Arab minority through land control).
367 See Interview with Oren Yiftachel, Prof. at Ben Gorion University,
at Ben Gorion University (2011), available at http://www.dirasataclp.org/arabic/files/Oren_Yiftahel_Kitab_Dirasat_2011.pdf (discussing
the Bedouin boycott of the Goldberg Committee).
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the plan, refused to cooperate, and advocated against the
plan. 368
C. COUNTERCLAIMS: THE ENDLESS EFFECT OF THE
ORDINANCE

In 2004, as part of the Negev Plan—in a step
designed to put additional pressure on Bedouin to coerce
them to settle their land claims—the State renewed the
adjudication of Bedouin land claims in courts and started
to submit mass counterclaim lawsuits against
Bedouin. 369 Israel vowed to adjudicate all Bedouin land
claims and settle the Bedouin land issue.370 To make the
plan more effective and assertive Israel allocated special
budgets, and hired a special team of lawyers and experts
to complete the task as soon as possible. 371
These counterclaims compel the Bedouin to
either settle their land claims or appear in court for
adjudication. 372 If claimants do not appear in court to
adjudicate their claims, the court would dismiss their

368

See Qiadat Alawasat Alar Abi Tarfud Attaanul Ma’ Lajnat
Goldberg Letasweat Alaradi [Arab Sector Leadership Refuses To Deal
With The Goldberg Committee To Resolve The Issue Of Land], ARABS 48
(Jan. 20, 2008), available at http://www.pls48.net/?mod=print&ID=25973
(reporting on the final statement of the Peace Tent Conference for land and
housing protection).
369 See Elsana, supra note 4 at 34.
370 See id.
371
See ADALAH, supra note 248 at 10.
372 See Yahel, supra note 69.
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claim and confiscate the land. 373 The government also
raised the compensation offer, for a limited time of three
years, in order to speed up the process, and increased the
land component compensation from 20% to 30%. 374 At
the same time, it warned that those who refuse to settle
their land claims would be deprived of both their land
and compensation. 375
The results have been devastating for Bedouin
land rights. Shortly after 2004, the State brought more
than 130 counter-claims to Bedouin land claims; the
State won forty cases, relating to about 6177 acres
(25,000 dunams) that were registered in the name of the
State. 376 As of April 2016, Bedouins have lost every land
case that has come to trial. 377 In an effort to extinguish

373 See The Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality, THE ARABBEDOUINS OF THE NAQAB- NEGEV DESERT IN ISRAEL (SHADOW REPORT) 1,
11–12 (2006).
374 See Decisions of the Council at its Meeting on 04/03/04, ISRAEL
LANDS
ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.mmi.gov.il/hodaotmmiint/show_h.asp?key=525&CodeMaarec
et=1 (last visited July 10, 2017) (outlining compensation land prices and
construction fields regarding the Negev Bedouin).
375 See id.
376 See Yahel, supra note 69 at 13.
377 See Supreme Court Rejects Appeal by Bedouin Land Rights Activist
Convicted of Trespassing, HAARETZ, November 22, 2018,
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/supreme-court-rejects-appeal-bybedouin-land-rights-activist-1.6677523 (last visited Apr 20, 2019); Jillian
BEDOUIN
BATTLE
DISPLACEMENT,
Kestler-D’Amours,
ISRAEL’S
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/20138281259452882
09.html (last visited Apr 20, 2019) (Israeli courts have ruled in favor of the
Israeli government in 100 percent of bedouin land ownership cases to date);
C.A 4220/12 Al-Uqbi vs. State of Israel, , Nivo 2015.
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the Bedouin land issue, the State summons Bedouin
claimants to the Land Settlement Office one by one, or
tribe by tribe, to settle Bedouin land claims. 378
D. NEGEV LAND ACQUISITION (PEACE TREATY) 1980

Israel also utilized Negev Land Acquisition
legislation to dispossess Bedouin land. In 1979, the State
signed the Camp David Peace Agreement with Egypt. 379
According to the agreement, Israel agreed to withdraw
from the Sinai Peninsula and remove its military bases
from Egypt. 380 Rather than selecting alternative
available places in the Negev, Israel decided to relocate
the military airport and the military bases on Bedouin
land in the Tal-Almalah region, where a major
concentration of Bedouin tribes and lands are located. 381
In order to avoid legal intervention by Bedouin
or human rights groups, Israel passed the Negev Land
Acquisition Law of 1980, known as the Peace Treaty
with Egypt (“Peace Treaty Law”). 382 The Peace Treaty
Law imposed Bedouin eviction and land dispossession,
and established the compensation process by law. 383 This

378 See Ronit Levine-Schnur, Regulating Bedouin Settlement: A
Disengagement Plan for the Negev, ISR. DEMOCR. INST. 22–23,
https://www.academia.edu/5348554/Regulating_Bedouin_Settlement_A_
Disengagement_Plan_for_the_Negev (last visited July 4, 2017).
379 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 64, at 15.
380 See David K. Shipler, Israelis Approve Sinai Withdrawal, N.Y.
TIMES, (April 22, 1982).
381 See ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 270, at 64–65.
382
See The Negev Land Acquisition, supra note 156.
383 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 64, at 15-16.
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law allowed the State to evict all Bedouin people in the
Tal-Almalah area and exile them to the designated
townships of Arara and Ksyefeh. 384 It also allowed the
State to confiscate their land in exchange for small
amounts of compensation, with a price fixed by law. 385
Although it was designed specifically for the TalAlmalah region, the State applied the Peace Treaty Law
to all Bedouin land settlement matters, especially to
matters regarding land compensation. 386 Today, the law
defines both the monetary and land components of
compensation. 387
The Peace Treaty Law not only physically
dispossessed Bedouins of their land, but also subjected
them to inadequate and discriminatory compensation
rules. Compensation paid to other settlers highlights
inequity: the State paid Jewish settlers evacuated from
the Negev in the same year more than ten times the
amount paid to the dislocated Bedouin. 388 Twenty-four
years later, when the State evicted Bedouin and Jewish
residents from Gaza Strip, compensation reflected a
comparable disparity. 389 Following the 1980 Peace
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Agreement, the State worked to confiscate as much
Bedouin land as possible with these inequitable
compensation terms. 390
E. PUBLIC LAND ACT (REMOVAL OF SQUATTERS) OF
2005

In 2005, the government enacted additional
legislation aimed to further dispossess Bedouin land.
The law, part of an amendment to the Public Land Act,
gives local authorities the power to issue orders for the
removal of squatters from public land without judicial
review, a previously mandatory step. 391 The obvious
purpose of the Act is to prevent Bedouins from using
their traditional land—which the State defines as public
land—and to evict them quickly if they do use it. 392
VI. CONCLUSION

Through administrative activities and various
legislation, Israel established a system that dispossesses
Bedouin land 393 and targets Bedouin land rights on
multiple levels. 394 Such laws not only facilitate Bedouin

390

See ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 270 at 3.
See Amara, supra note 78, at 38-39.
392 See Adalah, Discriminatory and Anti-Democratic Laws, ADALAH'S
NEWS
L.
1,
(Feb.
2008)
available
at
http://www.adalah.org/newsletter/heb/feb08/2.php.
393
See Amara, supra note 78, at 29.
394 See id.
391
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land dispossession, but also enable and legitimize land
dispossession by the executive and judiciary branches. 395
The case of Bedouin land dispossession mirrors
the systematic dispossession of indigenous peoples by
colonial powers, who employed methods of invasion,
occupation, removal, concentration, denial of land
rights, legislation initiatives, and strategic policies, to
dispossess land. 396 Additionally, the Israeli State, also
made many physical changes to the Bedouin landscape,
further disconnecting the Bedouins physically,
economically, and emotionally from their land. 397 Such
changes destroyed the Bedouins’ traditional economy,398
undermined their traditional leadership, and literally
changed the Bedouins’ landscape by building towns and
projects on their land. 399 These changes were designed
to convince the Bedouins that restoring the land to the

395

See Geremy Forman & Alexandre Kedar, Colonialism,
Colonization and Land Law in Mandate Palestine: The Zor al-Zarqa and
Barrat Qisarya Land Disputes in Historical Perspective, 4 THEOR. INQ.
LAW, 496 (2003), http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/til.2003.4.issue2/til.2003.4.2.1074/til.2003.4.2.1074.xml?onlyResultQuery=chinese (last
visited July 10, 2017).
396 See Walid Salem, Jerusalem: Reconsidering the Settler Colonial
Analysis, 21 PALESTINE-ISR. J. OF POL., ECON. AND CULTURE (2016),
http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=1706.
397 See id.
398 See Moshe Dayan, On Land Policy and the Bedouin Problem,
HAARETZ, (July 31, 1963), cited in ISSACHAR ROSEN-ZVI, TAKING SPACE
SERIOUSLY: LAW, SPACE, AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY ISRAEL, 60
(Ashgate Publ’g Ltd., 2004).
399 See Amara, supra note 78, at 279-80.
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Bedouins is not an option, 400 and that the only available
solution to Bedouin land claims is through financial
compensation. 401 This is created a psychology that keeps
pushing many Bedouins toward settling their land rights
and giving up their longtime struggle.
The most important consideration is the way
Israel’s actions and legislations were able to manipulate
legal rights and eliminate the Bedouins ability to
advocate for their land. 402 The State changed procedures,
changed the burden of proof, delayed the adjudication
process until witnesses died, and ignored a substantial
law that could recognize Bedouin rights under the
principle of equity. 403 In addition, Bedouin professional
and economic disadvantages, coupled with linguistic

400

See Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.); Wik
Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1 (Austl.) (addressing the
difficulties of recognizing Aboriginal rights due to the new realities
surrounding their land).
401 See Admin C (BS) 257/04 Ass’n for Support and Prot. Of Bedouin
Rights in Israel v. The Nat’l Planning and Constr., PM 2004(2) 7038 (2004)
(Isr.) (finding no connection to land after the State evicted Bedouin from
their land in the 1950s and refusing to interfere in the State’s project to build
a Jewish town on Bedouin land).
402 See id.; Elisabeth Marteu, Some Reflections on How Bedouin
Women of the Negev Relate to Politics: Between Political Marginalization
and Social Mobilization, 16 BULL. OF THE FRENCH RES. CTR. IN JERUSALEM,
271, 273-74 (2005) (discussing Israeli nationalization of Bedouin land).
403 See Yahel, supra note 69 (stating “from 1978 until 2003 agreed
settlements of claims were achieved with regard to over 140,000 dumans,
most of them in the area of airfields”).
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obstacles, are eliminating Bedouin chances to win in
courts. 404

404

See Ismael Abu-Saad, Education as a Tool for Control vs.
Development Among Indigenous Peoples: The Case of Bedouin Arabs in
Israel, 2 HAGAR INT’L SOC. SCI. REV., 241, 245, 256 (2001) (discussing
socio-economic, linguistic, and educational challenges Negev Bedouin
community faces).

